By Gareth Porter
  
   WASHINGTON, May 24      IPS) - Iran offered in 2003 to accept peace      with Israel and to cut off material assistance to Palestinian      armed groups and pressure them to halt terrorist attacks within      Israel's 1967 borders, according to the secret Iranian proposal      to the United States.
  
   The two-page proposal for a broad Iran-U.S. agreement covering      all the issues separating the two countries, a copy of which was      obtained by IPS, was conveyed to the United States in late April      or early May 2003. Trita Parsi, a specialist on Iranian foreign      policy at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced      International Studies who provided the document to IPS, says he      got it from an Iranian official earlier this year but is not at      liberty to reveal the source.
  
   The two-page document contradicts the official line of the      George W. Bush administration that Iran is committed to the      destruction of Israel and the sponsorship of terrorism in the      region.
  
   Parsi says the document is a summary of an even more detailed      Iranian negotiating proposal which he learned about in 2003 from      the U.S. intermediary who carried it to the State Department on      behalf of the Swiss Embassy in late April or early May 2003. The      intermediary has not yet agreed to be identified, according to      Parsi.
  
   The Iranian negotiating proposal indicated clearly that Iran was      prepared to give up its role as a supporter of armed groups in      the region in return for a larger bargain with the United      States. What the Iranians wanted in return, as suggested by the      document itself as well as expert observers of Iranian policy,      was an end to U.S. hostility and recognition of Iran as a      legitimate power in the region.
  
   Before the 2003 proposal, Iran had attacked Arab governments      which had supported the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The      negotiating document, however, offered "acceptance of the Arab      League Beirut declaration", which it also referred to as the      "Saudi initiative, two-states approach."
  
   The March 2002 Beirut declaration represented the Arab League's      first official acceptance of the land-for-peace principle as      well as a comprehensive peace with Israel in return for Israel's      withdrawal to the territory it had controlled before the 1967      war.. Iran's proposed concession on the issue would have aligned      its policy with that of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, among others      with whom the United States enjoyed intimate relations.
  
   Another concession in the document was a "stop of any material      support to Palestinian opposition groups (Hamas, Jihad, etc.)      from Iranian territory" along with "pressure on these      organizations to stop violent actions against civilians within      borders of 1967".
  
   Even more surprising, given the extremely close relationship      between Iran and the Lebanon-based Hizbollah Shiite organisation,      the proposal offered to take "action on Hizbollah to become a      mere political organization within Lebanon".
  
   The Iranian proposal also offered to accept much tighter      controls by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in      exchange for "full access to peaceful nuclear technology". It      offered "full cooperation with IAEA based on Iranian adoption of      all relevant instruments (93+2 and all further IAEA protocols)".    
  
   That was a reference to protocols which would require Iran to      provide IAEA monitors with access to any facility they might      request, whether it had been declared by Iran or not. That would      have made it much more difficult for Iran to carry out any      secret nuclear activities without being detected.
  
   In return for these concessions, which contradicted Iran's      public rhetoric about Israel and anti-Israeli forces, the secret      Iranian proposal sought U.S. agreement to a list of Iranian      aims. The list included a "Halt in U.S. hostile behavior and      rectification of status of Iran in the U.S.", as well as the      "abolishment of all sanctions".
  
   Also included among Iran's aims was "recognition of Iran's      legitimate security interests in the region with according      defense capacity". According to a number of Iran specialists,      the aim of security and an official acknowledgment of Iran's      status as a regional power were central to the Iranian interest      in a broad agreement with the United States.
  
   Negotiation of a deal with the United States that would advance      Iran's security and fundamental geopolitical political interests      in the Persian Gulf region in return for accepting the existence      of Israel and other Iranian concessions has long been discussed      among senior Iranian national security officials, according to      Parsi and other analysts of Iranian national security policy.    
  
   An Iranian threat to destroy Israel has been a major propaganda      theme of the Bush administration for months. On Mar. 10, Bush      said, "The Iranian president has stated his desire to destroy      our ally, Israel. So when you start listening to what he has      said to their desire to develop a nuclear weapon, then you begin      to see an issue of grave national security concern."
  
   But in 2003, Bush refused to allow any response to the Iranian      offer to negotiate an agreement that would have accepted the      existence of Israel. Flynt Leverett, then the senior specialist      on the Middle East on the National Security Council staff,      recalled in an interview with IPS that it was "literally a few      days" between the receipt of the Iranian proposal and the      dispatch of a message to the Swiss ambassador expressing      displeasure that he had forwarded it to Washington.
  
   Interest in such a deal is still very much alive in Tehran,      despite the U.S. refusal to respond to the 2003 proposal.      Turkish international relations professor Mustafa Kibaroglu of      Bilkent University writes in the latest issue of Middle East      Journal that "senior analysts" from Iran told him in July 2005      that "the formal recognition of Israel by Iran may also be      possible if essentially a 'grand bargain' can be achieved      between the U.S. and Iran".
  
   The proposal's offer to dismantle the main thrust of Iran's      Islamic and anti-Israel policy would be strongly opposed by some      of the extreme conservatives among the mullahs who engineered      the repression of the reformist movement in 2004 and who backed      President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in last year's election.
  
   However, many conservative opponents of the reform movement in      Iran have also supported a negotiated deal with the United      States that would benefit Iran, according to Paul Pillar, the      former national intelligence officer on Iran. "Even some of the      hardliners accepted the idea that if you could strike a deal      with the devil, you would do it," he said in an interview with      IPS last month.
  
   The conservatives were unhappy not with the idea of a deal with      the United States but with the fact that it was a supporter of      the reform movement of Pres. Mohammad Khatami, who would get the      credit for the breakthrough, Pillar said.
  
   Parsi says that the ultimate authority on Iran's foreign policy,      Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was "directly      involved" in the Iranian proposal, according to the senior      Iranian national security officials he interviewed in 2004.      Kamenei has aligned himself with the conservatives in opposing      the pro-democratic movement.
  
   Gareth Porter is an historian and national security policy      analyst. His latest book, "Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of      Power and the Road to War in Vietnam", was published in June      2005. (END/2006)             
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source: Information Clearing House
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